Eastern Christians celebrate night when Jesus blesses the faithful

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by Jessy Chahine- DailyStar.com.lb

Listen carefully. Bells are ringing. There must be a hundred of them or even a thousand! Are all the churches of the world communicating tonight? It’s Jan. 5, the night before the Christian holiday of Epiphany, the day when Jesus is said to have been baptized. In the little town of Mar Takla ­ in Beirut’s suburbs ­ peaceful religious chants are heard from a distance, emanating from the central plaza’s church.

Lebanese Christian tradition calls this night Laylat al-Qadr, the Night of Destiny. As midnight drew closer, 5-year-old Miriam Khoury clenched her mother’s side tighter. Anxiously scrutinizing her elders, the little one seemed bemused. Her tiny, wide-open eyes were constantly searching the place as if looking for a sign. “Is he here yet mama? Is he?” she whispers to her mother. “If you don’t stay calm and pray like a nice little girl, he won’t come at all!” the mother answers. Miriam’s impatience is one shared by millions of others, both adults and children. For it is local belief that in this night, the night of Epiphany, Jesus passes by at midnight through all houses and buildings to bestow his blessings upon believers. “It is also strongly believed that living creatures of all kind bend in awe at his passage ­ men, trees, flowers,” explains R.F. Toubia, the head priest of the Mar Takla church. “Even the nonliving, they say, are in a state of worship tonight. Some have reported seeing rocks rolling and mountains moving,” he continues. “Of course, these might sound like mad fantasies to some,” the priest says, “but they certainly reflect one thing: A sincere belief in the powers of this night.”

In Christian traditions across the world, Jan. 6 is known as Epiphany. According to the Christian Resource Institute ­ a biblical and theological resource ­ this holiday “goes by other names in various church traditions. For instance, in Hispanic and Latin culture, as well as some places in Europe, it is known as ‘Three Kings’ Day,’” referring to the three wise men or Magi who brought gifts to the infant Jesus. The site adds that, with the exception of the Russian Orthodox Church ­ which celebrates Epiphany as the Theophany on Jan. 19 ­ both Eastern Orthodox and Western Church calendars agree on Jan. 6 as the day of Epiphany. In Lebanon, Laylat al-Qadr has always been celebrated on the eve of Epiphany. “Christ’s passage symbolizes an invitation to start a brand new life,” says Toubia. “And the day that follows, the Epiphany, is when all our sins will be washed away, hence remembering the Christ’s baptism.” This night also always coincides with the Armenian Orthodox Church’s Christmas Eve. In Lebanon, the holiday is celebrated “in unison” by the three different Christian communities: Maronites, Catholics and the Orthodox.

However, although the dates coincide, for these communities the ways of celebration are different. While the Maronites and Catholics celebrate a midnight Mass, the Orthodox generally spend part of the night in church, reading the bible and praying, awaiting for an early morning Mass. Yet for all Christians, this night has its own magic. “Ever since I was little the Epiphany night held a special place in our familial and social traditions,” 65-year-old Lucie Bitar says, while sticking a piece of fresh dough full of pennies onto her wall. “This is the 50th time that I’ve done this,” she says, pointing to the dough. “I’ve taught my children’s children how to do it, too!” The dough, Bitar explains, is part of Laylat al-Qadr. “It’s plain raw dough that you fill in with some pennies and stick it to the wall above your house’s entrance,” she says. “During Jesus’s passage, the dough and the pennies will be blessed, and in the next morning, we pull off the dough, take out the pennies from it, and distribute them to each other.” According to her, the pennies are said to preserve their holder from poverty. Local traditions also play a large role in the celebration of this night. “Once we go back from church, we keep the doors in our building open all night long,” said Zeina Khoury, 22. “Our balcony’s lights are also on the whole time: It’s our symbol of hospitality to the holy visitor.” Meanwhile, inside the house on the following morning those searching for a new beginning this year take a shower in commemoration of the holy baptism. On the table, Lebanese cuisine adds a special touch to this celebration with three main sweet dishes: Maakroun (a sweet made of fried noodle-like dough, with peanuts added on top of it), Zlabia (fried dough served with icing powder) and Ouwaymat (fried dough served with sugar syrup)

European cuisine is also part of the festivities, as La Galette des Rois (The Kings’ Cake) is baked and served with a plastic crown on the top of it. During the baking process, a heat-resistant bauble is slipped into the cake. The one who’s lucky enough find it will wear the crown and hence be “king” ­ for the rest of the year. But not all those who eat the food and celebrate the holiday necessarily believe. “I don’t know whether it’s true or not that Christ comes in at midnight,” 19-year-old Nathalie says, coming out of the church after the midnight Mass. “But one thing is for sure: We, the Oriental people, have a tendency to magnify everything, and to make it a bit more ‘magical and fantastic,’ just like our handwriting, and our poetry.” In the small Mar Takla church, the Mass ended at midnight sharp when the bells started ringing more than ever and little Miriam’s eyes got even bigger than before. And on the way out, people shook hands, saying the traditional greeting that comes with this night: “Al-Dayem dayem” ­ or “the everlasting never forgets to visit.”

Striking differences between the leadership styles of Saudi Arabia's crown prince and Iran's Ayatollah could decide the future of peace in the Middle East

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Article represents opinion of the author 

By Seyed Hossein Mousavian, LobeLog 

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) is steadily consolidating power in Riyadh and positioning himself to become the most powerful ruler in Saudi history. His rise has been accompanied with a ratcheting up of hostilities against Iran and even war rhetoric. As Saudi-Iran tensions increase, the lived experiences and leadership styles of the 78-year-old Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and 32-year-old MBS will decide the future of peace and stability in the region. Before Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Khamenei was a political activist who opposed the dictatorship of the Shah and endured 15 years of prison, torture, and exile. He rose through the revolutionary ranks after the revolution and in 1981, was elected president. During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988)—which saw the United States and other global powers as well as regional Arab states support the aggressor Saddam Hussein—Ayatollah Khamenei played a key role in overseeing and leading the war effort. MBS, on the other hand, was just born in 1985 and has no comparable experience. During the 1980s, Iran also faced a wave of terrorism, with the MEK group alone responsible for over 17,000 deaths. Ayatollah Khamenei is himself a victim of terrorism, with one his arms left paralyzed after a bomb attack in 1981. The silver lining of Iran’s history of falling victim to terrorism is that its leaders have become counterterrorism veterans—another reason for Iran’s success in combatting terrorist groups throughout the region. MBS, meanwhile, does not have a counterterrorism track record and was preparing to take the reins of power at a time when, according to a 2014 email by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, his country was “providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL.” Mohammed bin Salman Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman attends the Annual Horse Race ceremony, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, December 30, 2017. Bandar Algaloud/Courtesy of Saudi Royal Court/Handout via REUTERS

Divergent foreign policies

Ayatollah Khamenei has for 28 years presided over a state that has been subject to every form of economic, political, and security pressure by outside powers—chiefly the United States—aimed at spurring regime change. However, not only has Iran’s security and stability endured during this period, but the country has emerged as an influential regional power. Policies of sanctions, pressure, and threats of war against Tehran have in fact resulted in Iran consolidating its position as the only regional state not beholden to foreign powers for its security. Moreover, Ayatollah Khamenei’s national security strategy has been premised on the belief that resisting U.S. hegemonic aspirations in the Middle East is not only the source of Iran’s strength, but allows it to maintain its independence. On the contrary, the Saudi royal family views the United States as its security guarantor and has relied on U.S. military, political, and economic patronage for decades. In May, MBS signaled his aim to continue this dependency by signing the largest arms deal in U.S. history for $350 billion—and thereby winning full support for his regional and domestic agenda from the White House. Within the region, Tehran has formed a strategic partnership with Russia. At the behest of the Syrian and Iraqi governments, Tehran has played a key role in those countries to secure their territorial integrity and defeat terrorist organizations in the vein of the Islamic State (ISIS or IS). Saudi Arabia, despite being given carte blanche by the Trump White House, has waded into a quagmire in Yemen, creating the world’s greatest humanitarian catastrophe with its ferocious bombing campaign. It has failed in its attempt to orchestrate regime change in Qatar and Syria, witnessed its effort to undermine the Lebanese government backfire in full view of the international community, and maintains an ever-more precarious hold over Bahrain. Such actions have earned MBS a reputation as hotheaded and impulsive, with The New York Times noting how many in Saudi Arabia view him as “brash, power-hungry and inexperienced.” Other analysts have stated how under MBS, “Saudi Arabia has become an irrational actor in the Middle East.”

Another vital aspect of Iran’s national and regional security strategy has been its experience in successfully mobilizing popular forces to complement its professional armed forces. Ayatollah Khomeini initiated this policy after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran in 1980, which led to the creation of popular militia units that would eventually become the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and Basij. Ayatollah Sistani, Iraq’s most senior religious leader, emulated this model of mobilizing popular forces in 2014 after IS overran large parts of the country. The ensuing “Popular Mobilization Forces” played a decisive role in the fight against IS. A similar model has also been implemented in Syria with the National Defense Forces and other groups.

Iran has also made opposition to Israel a core aspect of its foreign policy and has paid a high cost for its support of the Palestinians. On the other side, MBS is rapidly fostering ties with Israel in an attempt to confront Iranian regional influence. Saudi Arabia’s green light to President Donald Trump to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel will contribute dramatically to the erosion of the king’s popularity and legitimacy while making it easier for Iran to influence the Muslim world to stand together to resist the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia in defense of the Palestinians and the holy sites. Ayatollah Khamenei is well entrenched in his position, coming into it by way of a majority vote from Iran’s Assembly of Experts—a popularly elected body. He maintains legitimacy as a political figure and, as a Shia marja, is a religious guide to millions around the world. As recent purges indicate, MBS is sidelining his rivals to ward off potential obstacles to the crown once his father passes away or abdicates.

On matters of the economy, Ayatollah Khamenei and MBS also differ fundamentally. Although both Iran and Saudi Arabia suffer from corruption, chronic unemployment, and an oil-price plunge, Iran has in the face of these challenges taken steps to reform its inefficient subsidy system and diversify its economy. The World Bank has noted how oil accounts for roughly 30 percent of government revenues in Iran, as opposed to nearly 90 percent in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the IMF has said that Saudi Arabia will again this year run a deficit, further draining its foreign reserves. Given that traditionally Saudi Arabia’s influence in the Arab world has been based on its financial power, this declining financial prowess will undermine Saudi political leadership in the Arab world. The recent protests in various Iranian cities that have claimed a number of lives and injuries are rooted in economic grievances. At the same time, the Trump White House has coordinated belligerent actions against Iran with Israel and Saudi Arabia to more aggressive ends than in the past. MBS, whose consolidation of power in the kingdom Trump has emphatically supported, has explicitly declared that he would take “the battle” inside Iran. After the failures of the coup d’états in Turkey, Qatar, and most recently reportedly in Jordan—as well as the effective hostage taking of the Lebanese prime minister by Saudi Arabia—the Washington-Riyadh-Abu Dhabi-Tel Aviv axis is now seeking to exploit peaceful protests in Iran and stoke instability and chaos inside the country.

Divergent leadership styles

Iran’s leader was raised in a poor household and has maintained a modest lifestyle since assuming official positions after the revolution. In contrast, MBS has from birth lived in ornate palaces and never tasted personal hardship or poverty. Last year, The New York Times even reported that he owned a $500 million yacht. With over 50 years of political, military, and security experience, the Iranian leader is well versed in geopolitics and strategic decision-making and presides over a relatively efficient state with a rich civilization heritage. This is chiefly why, within the region, Iran has been able to make maximum gains with minimum costs, while Saudi Arabia has paid maximum costs and made minimum gains. Nevertheless, Mohammad bin Salman is a young and ambitious leader who has an unprecedented reform plan to transform Saudi Arabia into a more open society and curb the power of its fundamentalist Wahhabi religious establishment. This is precisely what Saudi Arabia needs. If he manages to succeed, the country will become a major force for stability and development in the region and the Arab world. On the other hand, the entire Middle East will witness a new wave of havoc if Saudi Arabia succumbs to chaos. After the eruption of the Arab uprisings in 2011, a major change in the region’s geopolitical landscape is inevitable. A zero-sum Iran-Saudi relationship will not only be detrimental to regional stability, it will diminish—not enhance—prospects for Saudi reform. Cooperation between these two major regional heavyweights remains the key element to shape a new peaceful Middle Eastern order and enable MBS to manage Saudi Arabia’s domestic challenges.

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New Lebanese Ambassador to the Holly See

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At 10.00 this morning, the Holy Father Francis received in audience H.E. Mr. Antonio Raymond Andary, ambassador of Lebanon to the Holy See, on the occasion of the presentation of his credential letters. The following is a brief biography of the new ambassador: H.E. Mr. Antonio Raymond Andary Ambassador of Lebanon Mr. Antonio Raymond Andary was born in Knaywer on 9 April 1954, and is married with three children. After attending primary and secondary school with the Carmelite Fathers in Tripoli, North Lebanon, he graduated in political science (University of Texas, Edinburg Campus, 1981) and subsequently obtained a master’s degree in international relations (American University, Washington, 1985). He has held the following positions: embassy official in Washington DC, member of the Executive Committee of the Maronite League, director of the Maronite League, director for Foreign Relations at the Maronite Foundation in the World; ambassador to Argentina (since 2013). He has held numerous lectures in cultural, university and social institutions on Lebanon, its culture, its political system, and the Christians of the East. Languages known: Arabic, French, English and Spanish.

USA State Department names 10 countries as worst religious freedom offenders

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By Christine Rousselle Washington D.C. (CNA/EWTN News).- The State Department on Thursday unveiled its list of countries designated as the worst offenders against religious liberty. Advocates of religious freedom applauded the list, but said that several additional countries should have been added. The countries of Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were labeled as “Countries of Particular Concern” (CPC) in the State Department’s report. The 10 countries on the CPC list are unchanged from last year. In addition, Pakistan was placed on a “Special Watch List,” which is a new category below that of Countries of Particular Concern. A country is labeled as a CPC after it engages in “systemic, ongoing, [and] egregious” violations of religious liberty. The “Special Watch List” is for countries that “engage in or tolerate severe violations” of religious liberty, but not to the extent of a CPC.

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), a government commission created in 1998 to study religious liberty around the world, praised the inclusion of the 10 CPC counties, but said that several others should have been added. The commission had recommended that Russia, Vietnam, Syria, Nigeria, and the Central African Republic be added, and that Pakistan should have been included on the list of CPCs, rather than the lower designation of “Special Watch List.” “The designation of these countries is a key step in ensuring continued U.S. engagement in support of international religious freedom. Although USCIRF agrees with the 10 countries on the State Department’s list, it does not go far enough,” said Daniel Mark, chairman of the commission, in a press release.

Mark said it was a “surprise and disappointment” that Pakistan was not added to the list of CPCs, especially given President Donald Trump’s past criticism of the nation, which has engaged in state-sponsored discrimination against religious minority groups, and has anti-blasphemy laws. Vietnam was previously designated as a CPC, but was taken off the list about a decade ago, in opposition to USCIRF’s recommendation. The commission has since called for it to be re-added to the list. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Rep. Ed Royce (R-Calif.) questioned why Vietnam was omitted from the list of CPCs. Royce said Vietnam has regularly violated both religious liberty and other basic human rights, and that it is the United States’ responsibility to call out these violations.

Pentagon surges weapons into Middle East terror fight

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by Jack Detsch - Al Monitor

The Donald Trump administration is giving hundreds of millions of dollars worth of weapons to US allies in the Middle East to fight the Islamic State (IS) as the militant group fans out toward Africa from its former safe havens in Iraq and Syria. Using a little-known US legal authority established by Congress after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the Pentagon is doling out substantial arms packages to build up Jordan's and Lebanon’s air forces to take on terrorists from the air. The Defense Department is also equipping special forces units in North African nations such as Morocco and Tunisia that face the threat of IS fighters returning to the region. The money is part of a $600 million global increase in Pentagon security assistance since Trump took office, according to congressional records reviewed by Al-Monitor.

It’s not clear whether the infusion of Pentagon money into foreign militaries represents a policy shift from the Barack Obama administration, which sought to build up local forces, so that the United States can begin to reduce its footprint on the front lines of the terror fight. The new infusion of money into the Pentagon comes as Trump's proposed budget threatens nearly $600 million in cuts to the State Department's foreign military financing program, zeroing out requests for Lebanon and Tunisia, which lawmakers have sought to restore. “This is a continuation of US policy since [the Sept. 11 attacks] to provide funds for building partner capacity,” said Seth Binder, the program manager for the Center for International Policy's Security Assistance Monitor. “It’s easier to get these funds to partners through [the Defense Department] instead of State.” The Pentagon money, authorized under Section 333 of the 2016 US defense budget, appears to be used for similar purposes as foreign military financing. The money, which is subject to human rights vetting procedures, could help to deal with returning IS fighters and border threats. Though US and Jordanian negotiators haven’t gotten any closer to making a deal on a long-term memorandum of understanding for defense after an earlier deal expired this year, the Pentagon OK'd more than $19 million in arms deliveries to Amman in October. The package includes explosive rockets, night vision goggles and M-4 machine guns. The United States also sent nearly $85 million worth of arms to the kingdom in March, including UH-60A helicopters and 105 mm howitzer cannons

. Deliveries approved in October also included a $120 million boost for Lebanon’s air power, including US-made light attack helicopters and high-performance drones, as well as supplying Tunisia with body armor and helicopters and outfitting a special forces unit in Morocco. The United States also plans to beef up special forces in North Africa as IS migrates away from the battlefield in Iraq and Syria. Using the train-and-equip fund, Tunisia will receive $13 million in body armor and outmoded choppers, while the Pentagon will also outfit a special forces unit in Morocco with more than $18 million in trucks, pistols, rifles and training from US forces to deal with the emerging threat. Weapons provided by the Trump administration could put Jordan and Lebanon in a stronger position to take the lead in the regional fight against terrorism. Jordan typically receives $1 billion in US foreign aid each year, while the Lebanese Armed Forces have received more than $1.4 billion in US security assistance since 2005, according to US Central Command. Designed as a fast-acting fund to get lethal support to US allies to fight terrorism during the George W. Bush administration, the Global Train and Equip Fund does not require the Pentagon to run each request for money by Congress on a country-by-country basis. Instead, the Defense Department receives an annual appropriation and notifies lawmakers each time it digs into the fund. The fund “was going to be a [Pentagon] short-term thing, and after a few years you’d switch to [foreign military financing],” said Dave Des Roches, a former US Army colonel who worked on the fund as a Pentagon civil servant. “As soon as it went out to the bureaucracy, every combatant commander got a little bit of it, and the bureaucracy spread it around.”

The arms deliveries, which have topped $1 billion for Middle East countries over the past three years, are also backed up by a significant US troop presence in these countries, according to figures released by the White House and the Defense Department. The Trump administration will need boots on the ground to build up local forces to fight terrorism. More than 2,500 US troops are stationed in the countries that benefit from the fund to make sure those weapons are used effectively — and that they do not fall into the wrong hands, including 2,300 American forces in Jordan, and about 100 each in Lebanon and Tunisia. “This is a fight against a transnational enemy, one that does not respect international borders and does not place geographic limits on their areas of operations,” US Defense Secretary James Mattis said at a Senate hearing in October. “So, necessarily, to defend our country, we must be prepared to swiftly engage this global enemy in conjunction with our allies and partners.” Two months later, in early December, Mattis attended the Aqaba Conference in Jordan, where Arab and African leaders met to undercut the spread of violent extremism in West Africa.

What are the lessons of the Arab uprisings for Iran’s protests?

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Article represents opinion of the author

by Marc Lynch - Washingtonpost - The protests that have broken out across Iran in recent days have generated remarkable excitement about the possibility of revolutionary change. The largest protest since the crushing of the 2009 Green Movement has surprised virtually all observers. The protests erupted in peripheral areas rather than in Tehran, and have been dominated by working- and lower-class Iranians rather than by the urban, educated middle class that drove the 2009 demonstrations. The slogans in these protests have notably featured revolutionary rather than reformist slogans. Seasoned observers of Iran have been stunned by the ferocity, speed and scope of these protests. It is important to recognize that much remains uncertain about them, including their real size, endurance, leadership and political aspirations. Analysis and punditry anticipating rapid regime collapse is running well ahead of events on the ground, or of what might usually be expected of the ability of the Iranian state to handle the challenge. While this enthusiasm may partly be wishful thinking, it is also clearly shaped by the experience of the 2011 Arab uprisings. Nobody expected that wave of popular mobilization, either, despite the manifest accumulation of economic and political grievances, and few expected the overthrow of deeply entrenched autocrats in Egypt and Tunisia. A wide range of scholars have spent the past seven years writing about the Arab uprisings of 2011 and their aftermath. How valuable is such a comparison? And what lessons might be drawn from the 2011 Arab experience? Here are some initial lessons from the Arab uprisings:

1. Revolutionary moments have their own logic … but they don’t last

The sudden eruption of mass mobilization is often unpredictable. In the Arab case, as in Iran, grievances mounted over many years: economic decline, failed governance, corrupt elites, elite infighting, overweening militaries and unpopular foreign policies. Repeated efforts by activists to trigger mass protest had repeatedly failed in the face of the seemingly overwhelming power of the security state. The sudden success of the uprisings surprised the activists as much as anyone else. Mobilization diffused rapidly within and across countries, with protesters in distant Yemen and Syria inspired by the images from Tunisia and Egypt on Al Jazeera and Facebook. It was the regional scope of the Arab uprisings as much as their powerful calls for freedom and social justice that made them appear to be on the right side of history. So far in Iran, there is no sign of any diffusion of these new protests beyond the country, despite the intense scrutiny and media interest. Instead, the protests have unfolded amid intense regional proxy wars and mounting calls for the Trump administration to tear up the Iran nuclear deal and more aggressively confront Tehran. The successful mobilization in Tunisia and then Egypt created new political realities, as people suddenly saw the possibility for political change that previously seemed utterly unrealistic. During revolutionary moments, the usual rules of politics seem to be suspended. Large numbers of previously politically quiescent people come into the streets; longtime rivals form alliances as they fight together on the streets; long-entrenched elites suddenly feel uncertain about their prospects for survival. During these moments, intentions, expectations and aspirations can rapidly change: What began as an economic protest can become a demand for regime change, what began as a call for elections can turn into demands for revolutionary change. Protesters are racing the clock, though. Uprisings gain power from the unexpected, massive shock to the system. In Tunisia and Egypt, huge crowds stayed in the streets, creating irresistible pressures, which forced long-ruling presidents from power in less than three weeks. But it is difficult to sustain mobilization indefinitely. Initial optimism fades, nonviolence is difficult to sustain, differences in political aspirations emerge, and the real power advantages of the state take their toll. Protesters have a relatively narrow window in which to make the regime’s survival appear impossible, to persuade the middle class and elites to support their cause, and to force an endgame. Regimes thus have every incentive to wait out the deluge and survive by any means necessary. Almost every Arab regime that withstood that initial onslaught of popular mobilization in 2011 stayed in power. Bahrain’s regime survived through externally backed, massive, brutal, violent repression and a follow-on campaign of sectarian reprisals. Jordan’s and Morocco’s kings navigated popular demands through constitutional reforms, co-optation and selective repression. Syria’s regime waged a brutal war against its challengers, with Iran’s help. The lessons will not be lost on Iran’s regime, which, like every other regime in the Middle East, prioritizes its own survival over all else.

2. Protesters have to attract broader support to win

The Arab uprisings generated their enormous power by bringing vast numbers of non-activists into the streets. In Egypt, for instance, young activists had been protesting in creative ways for a decade prior to 2011, but on their own they could not pose a serious threat to the state. Iran resembles Egypt in its history of protest and activism, as well as its robust and pugnacious media, more than it does those Arab countries, which ruthlessly policed all forms of public politics. As in Egypt, Iran’s protests have revealed little about the extent of popular grievances that was not already widely understood by Iranians. The impact of these Iranian protests could come instead through changing the expectations about the possibility of victory. There’s evidence of shock about the scale of the protests and a recalculation of the realm of the possible, but it is less clear whether and which new constituencies are joining the challenge. The Iranian protests are impressive in their geographical spread but seem to be quite small numerically compared with the early Arab uprisings (or the 2009 Iranian Green Movement) and peripheral. In Tunisia, protests started in the neglected south, but moved quickly into the capital and gained the support of powerful civil-society organizations. Thus far, the Iranian protests appear to be leaderless, concentrated among youth and the lower and working classes, alienated from formal politics, and detached from established civil society. This poses a challenge to Iranian reformists and civil-society activists, who are uncertain about the identity and aspirations of these new protesters.

3. The choices of the military are usually decisive

An enormous amount of research on the Arab uprisings has focused on the divergent reactions of various militaries. In Tunisia and Egypt, the military facilitated the departure of the president, while in Yemen the military fractured to set in motion months of political paralysis, and in Libya civil war erupted almost from the start. In most other Arab uprising cases, however, the military remained loyal and intact. While violence is growing in Iran as the protesters clash with security forces, there are few signs at this point of any real dissension or defection among Iranian security forces. As Iran scholar Karim Sadjapour said, “The Iranian regime’s vast coercive apparatus, as far as we can tell, remains cohesive, committed, and very well-practiced in repression.” Should the regime opt to escalate its repressive force, it enjoys an overwhelming advantage — and few international constraints on using it. The Iranian regime will attempt to calibrate its repressive violence to deter new protests without angering nonmobilized constituencies. As activist and writer Maryam Nayeb Yazdi has suggested, the regime’s choices on repression are shaped by the type and extent of the challenge. This poses particular political problems for President Hassan Rouhani. As scholar Ali Kadivar wrote: “In his 2017 campaign, Rouhani vocally criticized hard-liners for their authoritarian methods. He lambasted his hard-liner rivals for their repression of opposition, criticized the judiciary for violating the constitution and demanded the Revolutionary Guard stay out of politics.” Those commitments will be tested in the coming days, with Rouhani’s political rivals ready to take advantage. As for the protesters, they too must make difficult decisions about violence, especially if the protests lose momentum or regime repression increases. Better-organized and disciplined movements are more capable of sustaining nonviolent campaigns over time. The leaderless Iranian protests seem more likely to be open to escalation on the ground, regardless of any strategic decisions. The more protesters use violence, the easier it will be for the regime to justify unleashing its repressive machinery.

4. Social media is a mixed blessing

The rapid proliferation of protest videos from Iran echoes one of the more emblematic features of the Arab uprisings, as well as global trends in contentious politics. Smartphones, ubiquitous video, Telegram and social media have facilitated sudden, rapid, unexpected protest mobilization almost everywhere in the world. They enable coordination and diffusion of protest methods and slogans within a country and allow protesters to get their messages out to the international community. But social media is rife with pathologies for protest movements as well. Social media’s tendency toward ideological and partisan clustering creates information bubbles, which can be empowering in the short term but drive polarization later. What’s more, social media can convey highly misleading impressions of events, especially where there are few journalists on the ground to offer reality checks.

5. What about U.S. policy?

The Arab uprisings posed a sharp challenge to U.S. foreign policy by forcing a reckoning between rhetorical support for democracy and long-standing alliances with dictators. Supporting a democracy movement that targeted an ally required genuinely tough choices. The Iranian protests pose no such test. Nothing could be easier for Washington than to rhetorically support and seek to exploit domestic upheaval against an adversary. That rhetoric doesn’t matter all that much. The millions of Egyptians in the streets in 2011 were not waiting on President Barack Obama’s guidance, and Iranian protesters are not making decisions today based on a presidential tweet. But the lessons of the Arab uprisings for Iran should include a healthy dose of humility about the ability of the United States to control or shape events, and an understanding of the full scale of potential outcomes, both negative and positive.